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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of whether liability established under the Equal Pay
Act' and its burden of proof scheme will automatically lead to Title
VII2 liability has been the subject of much discussion and analysis.
However, differing conclusions have been reached by courts across the
country. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
recently addressed this question in Fallon v. Illinois.3 The Seventh
Circuit in Fallon held that a violation of the Equal Pay Act does not
automatically mean Title VII has also been violated, because the proof
and the allocation of the burden of proof required to establish a claim
under each statute is different (the "no equivalence" rule). The Sev-
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1988).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
3. 882 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1989).
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enth Circuit's negative answer to the question is consistent with the
reasoning and conclusions of the Fifth Circuit. On the other hand,
four other circuits 4 have answered the question affirmatively, finding
Title VII sex-based claims of unequal pay for equal work should be
analyzed under the Equal Pay Act's burden of proof scheme (the
"equivalence" rule).
The differing conclusions of the circuits on the question of whether
a violation of the Equal Pay Act automatically leads to Title VII liabil-
ity are important to plaintiffs who have possible sex-based wage dis-
crimination claims under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. Most
obviously, the courts' answers to the liability question affect the bur-
den of proof that will be placed upon a plaintiff to establish a claim
under Title VII. The answer is also important for other less obvious
reasons.
First, class actions are treated differently under the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII. A potential class member must give written consent to
become a class member under the Equal Pay Act.5 Under Title VII,
however, once a class action has been filed the court will exclude a
class member only if she notifies the court.6 As a general rule then it
is easier to establish a class action under Title VII. Therefore, under
the "equivalence" rule plaintiffs would be able to take advantage of
the favorable rules for establishing class actions under Title VII with-
out losing the favorable burden shifting rules of the Equal Pay Act.
The "no equivalence" rule would often force plaintiffs to either choose
between the two sets of rules or establish two separate classes--an
opt-in class for the Equal Pay Act claim and an opt-out class for the
Title VII claim.
Second, the remedial schemes available under the two statutes dif-
fer. If a plaintiff is successful, backpay under the Equal Pay Act runs
back in time to a point two years prior to the day on which the lawsuit
was filed,7 while under Title VII backpay extends back to two years
before a charge of discrimination is filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.8 The "equivalence" rule would permit a
plaintiff who has prevailed on an Equal Pay Act claim to obtain more
backpay if Title VII applied to a more favorable period of time. The
"no equivalence" rule would require that a plaintiff provide additional
evidence of a Title VII violation to obtain the additional backpay. 9
4. The Tenth, Ninth, Eighth and Sixth Circuits have held that liability under the
Equal Pay Act automatically leads to Title VII liability.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1988).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a)(1988).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(g)(1988).
9. On November 21, 1991, after this Note went to press, President Bush signed the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 into law. The new law effectively reverses seven
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Finally, the decision maker in a claim brought under each statute is
different. The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff in an Equal
Pay Act section 16 action has a right to a jury trial on a claim for un-
paid wages.lO On the other hand, the circuit courts have unanimously
concluded that a Title VII plaintiff has no ight to a jury trial when
backpay is sought." Under the "equivalence" rule the jury would be
the decision maker because all the issues are the same for the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII claims. Meanwhile, under the "no equivalence"
rule, a judge would decide all questions peculiar to Title VII (i.e.,
whether the plaintiff has met the burden of proving that the pay dif-
ferential is not justified by seniority, merit system, etc.).
This Note will examine the reasoning behind the circuits' differing
answers to the question of whether a violation of the Equal Pay Act
will automatically lead to Title VII liability and the effect the differ-
ent answers have on the allocation of the burden of proof under a Title
VII claim. Finally, a critical analysis will be done to determine which
rule, the "equivalence" or "no equivalence," is based upon better
reasoning.
II. BACKGROUND
Linda Fallon brought suit in federal district court against the State
of Illinois alleging violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Fallon was employed by the state as a Vet-
erans Service Officer Associate (VSOA), a position composed entirely
of females.13 The district court found that the jobs of VSOAs and Vet-
erans Service Officers (VSOs), a position composed entirely of males,
"were substantially equal within the meaning of the Equal Pay Act,
that female VSOAs were paid less than the male VSOs, and that no
factors other than sex justified the pay differential."14 The district
court then concluded that the State of Illinois had violated both the
Equal Pay Act and Title VII with respect to the plaintiff Fallon, and
had violated Title VII with respect to the class of VSOAs.15
The state appealed the district court's decision. First, the state al-
leged that the court's finding that the two jobs were "substantially
equal" under the Equal Pay Act was clearly erroneous. Second, the
Supreme Court decisions and expands the remedies available to a Title VII
claimant.
10. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
11. II C.A. SuLr'vAN, M.J. Znimm, & R.F. RicHARDs, EMPLOYmNT DiSCRIMINA-
TION, 57 (2d Ed. 1988).
12. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1989).
13. Id-
14. Id- (citation omitted).
15. Id
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state argued that a factor other than sex justified the differential.16
The State further argued that the district court had failed to find in-
tentional discrimination when it considered the Title VII claim. In-
stead, the State alleged, the court improperly relied upon its finding of
liability under the Equal Pay Act to find automatic Title VII
liability.17
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision in part, but reversed and remanded two issues.
After viewing the evidence, the court affirmed the district coaurt's find-
ing the VSO and VSOA jobs were substantially equal, stating it was
not firmly convinced the district court was mistaken.'8
The court then found the district court had prematurely rejected
the State's assertion that the VSO's requisite wartime veteran status
was a "factor other than sex" which justified the pay differential. The
court found the district court had improperly rejected the defense as a
matter of law, stating that under proper circumstances the wartime
veteran status could be a valid factor other than sex.19 Accordingly,
the court remanded the case to district court to make appropriate find-
ings on the issue.
In addressing the question of whether liability under the Equal
Pay Act leads automatically to Title VII liability, the court decided the
statutes were distinct and required different proof. In formulating its
conclusion that the acts are distinct, the Fallon court examined the
acts individually and looked at what was required to establish a case
under each.
The court, following guidelines established by the Supreme Court
in its first case interpreting the Equal Pay Act, Corning Glass Works
v. Brennan,20 set out the requirements necessary to prove a prima fa-
cie case under the Equal Pay Act. The court stated, "a plaintiff must
show: (1) that different wages are paid to employees of the opposite
sex; (2) that the employees do equal work which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility; and (3) that the employees have similar
working conditions."21
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the
Equal Pay Act, the court found the burden then shifts to the defend-
ant to show the pay disparity is due to one of four exemptions estab-
lished by the Equal Pay Act.22 The Supreme Court in Brennan found
16. IM
17. I.
18. Id- at 1210.
19. I& at 1212.
20. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
21. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206,1208 (7th Cir. 1989)(quoting Coming Glass Works
v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974)).
22. Id. at 1211.
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that the exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act are affirma-
tive defenses on which the employer (defendant) bears the burden of
proof.23 Accordingly, the Fallon court stated it is up to the employer
to prove that the pay disparity is due to: "(1) a seniority system; (2) a
merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
quality of production; or (4) any other factor other than sex."24
The court concluded that under the Equal Pay Act, once a plaintiff
has proven a prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to the
defendant to establish that the pay disparity is due to one of the four
exemptions established by the Equal Pay Act. The pay disparity must
be proven by the defendant as due to a factor other than sex. Thus,
under the Equal Pay Act, once a prima facie case has been established,
the risk of nonpersuasion rests with the defendant on the ultimate
issue of liability.25
In examining the allocations of the burden of proof under a Title
VII claim, the Fallon court looked to the Supreme Court's decision in
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.26 Relying upon
Burdine, the Fallon court stated that under Title VII, in all but a few
cases,27 the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a prima facie case.28
To establish a prima facie case under Title VII, the plaintiff must
prove the defendant's intent to discriminate or establish facts suffi-
cient to create an inference of discriminatory intent.29
Once the plaintiff has done this, the defendant carries only a bur-
den of production to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the pay disparity. The plaintiff then has a chance to prove that the
reason given by the defendant is only a pretext for discrimination.
The court stated that under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion at all times to show discriminatory intent.3 0 Accordingly,
under Title VII the plaintiff always carries the risk of nonpersuasion
on the ultimate issue of liability.
The Fallon court concluded that although the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII are similar, they remain distinct. The proof required to es-
tablish a claim under each is different and each statute's allocation of
the burden of proof in a sex-based discrimination claim of unequal pay
for equal work is different. Therefore, the court held, "a finding of
Equal Pay Act liability, without more, will not lead automatically to
23. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
24. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1989); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(i)-(iv)
(1988). See also Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196 (1974).
25. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989).
26. 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 280 (1989).
28. Failon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206,1213 (7th Cir. 1989)(citing Texas Dep't of Commu-
nity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1981)).
29. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
30. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989).
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liability under Title VII."s1 The court then remanded the case to the
district court as to the Title VII claim to make more explicit findings
in regard to intentional discrimination.
Regardless of the differences the Seventh Circuit in Fallkn found
between the statutes regarding both proof and the allocation of the
burden of proof, the Tenth, Ninth, Eighth and Sixth Circuits have
held that the burdens of proof a Title VII sex-based wage discrimina-
tion plaintiff must establish in an unequal pay for equal work case are
those set out under the Equal Pay Act. Therefore, a finding of liability
under the Equal Pay Act automatically establishes liability under Ti-
tle VII. The Seventh Circuit stated in Fallon it was not persuaded by
the reasoning used by the Tenth, Ninth and Eighth Circuit courts to
equate the statutes, "thus, we will continue to adhere to the tradi-
tional analysis of Title VII claims, namely, that a plaintiff bears the
burden of proof to show discriminatory intent."32 Since the Seventh
Circuit decided Fallon, the Sixth Circuit has issued an opinion that is
consistent with the Tenth, Ninth and Eighth circuits.
In order to determine which circuit's answer is based upon better
reasoning, it is necessary to: (1) examine the history of the two stat-
utes to see where they overlap in the area of sex-based wage discrimi-
nation cases; (2) examine the cases where the circuits have found sex-
based claims of unequal pay for equal work under both Title VII and
the Equal Pay Act are to be analyzed according to the Equal Pay Act
and its burden of proof scheme (making the analysis of an equal pay
for equal work claim under Title VII equivalent to an analysis of the
same claim under the Equal Pay Act) and the Seventh Circuit's re-
sponse to their reasoning; and (3) critically analyze the basis the op-
posing holdings are based upon, setting forth which holding is most
strongly supported.
III. ANALYSIS
A. History of Title VII's Bennett Amendment
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act in 1963 "to remedy what was
perceived to be a serious and endemic problem of [sex-based] employ-
ment discrimination in private industry."33 Therefore, when Congress
passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 it became the second
bill to relate to employment discrimination. Originally Title VII ex-
tended only to discrimination based on race, color, religion and na-
tional origin.34 The Bill was amended late in its debate before the
31. Id at 1218.
32. Id. at 1214.
33. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
34. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADIN. NEws 2355.
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House to also proscribe sex discrimination, but the House did not dis-
cuss the implications of the overlapping jurisdiction of the amended
Title VII with its proscription against sex discrimination and the
Equal Pay Act before it passed the Bill and sent it to the Senate.35
The Senate began consideration of the House version of Title VII
without the Bill being referred to committee,36 foregoing any chance
to have the overlap between the two Acts analyzed. In response to the
concern of several Senators that insufficient attention had been paid
to possible inconsistencies between the statutes,3 7 Senator Bennett
proposed a "technical amendment" to the Civil Rights Bill.38 The
Bennett Amendment to Title VII passed with no controversy, the en-
tire discussion on it comprised just a few short statements.3 9 The
Amendment provides:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer
if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section 206(d) of Title
29.40
Due to the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Bennett
Amendment, only a smattering of legislative history was generated.
As a result, there has been much controversy over what effect the
Amendment has on Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims,
specifically in regard to its effect on the allocation of the burden of
proof in Title VII sex-based unequal pay for equal work claims. The
Tenth, Ninth, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits have all found that the incor-
poration of the Bennett Amendment into Title VII effectively incorpo-
35. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964). For more information about the amendment of
Title VII to include sex discrimination, see Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments:
The Reasons Congress Added Sex To Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue
of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REv. 453 (1981); Miller, Sex Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1967).
36. 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
37. See id. at 7217 (statement of Sen. Clark); id. at 13647 (statement of Sen. Bennett).
38. Id. at 13310. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Bennett Amend-
ment, see Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171-76 (1981); EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1330 n.88 (N.D.Ill. 1986).
39. See 110 CoNG. REc. 13647 (1964).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(1988). 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1988) provides:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section
shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees
are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort,
and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working con-
ditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality or production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex....
[Vol. 70:614
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rated the Equal Pay Act's allocation of the burdens of proof into Title
VII sex-based claims of unequal pay for equal work, while the Seventh
and Fifth Circuits4 ' have found that the Bennett Amendment incorpo-
rated the substance of the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into
Title VII, but did not alter Title VII's burden of proof scheme in re-
gard to sex-based wage discrimination claims.
B. An Overview of the Tenth, Ninth, Eighth and Sixth Circuits
1. Tenth Circuit
In 1971 the Tenth Circuit in Ammons v. Zia Co.42 addressed the
issue of the proper burden of proof under a Title VII claim where the
plaintiff alleged she was denied additional compensation because of
her sex.43 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the proper burdens of
proof in the Title VII case were those delineated under the Equal Pay
Act.44 The court based its conclusion on the fact that the provisions of
the Civil Rights Act that regard sex-based wage discrimination have
been interpreted to be in pari materia with the Equal Pay Act, that
both acts serve the same fundamental purpose, and that the acts
should not be construed in a manner which "by virtue of section
703(h) would undermine the Civil Rights Act."45
The Seventh Circuit in Fallon responded to the Tenth Circuit's
conclusion by stating that even if the propositions supporting the con-
clusion were true, they alone do not justify altering Title VII's burden
of proof scheme.4 6 The court stated that application of the traditional
Title VII burden shifting analysis would not allow section 703(h),47 to
undermine Title VII. The two causes of action, the court held, can be
treated as distinct and still serve their respective purposes.48
41. The Fifth Circuit in Peters v. Shreveport, 818 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1987), examined
the issue of whether a Title VII equal pay case was to be analyzed under the
Equal Pay Act and its burden of proof scheme. The court did not discuss its hold-
ing in relation to the other circuits. The court found although the Bennett
Amendment was an attempt to reconcile the two statutes by incorporating the
four Equal Pay Act affirmative defenses into the structure of Title VII, the prin-
ciple that the Act should in general be interpreted consistently with Title VII
does not by itself support an interpretation that the causal element of a Title VII
plaintiff's case and the showing an employer must make under the Equal Pay
Act's fourth affirmative defense are identical.
42. 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
43. Id. at 118.
44. Id. at 119.
45. Id.
46. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1215 (7th Cir. 1989).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(1988).




In 1979 the Ninth Circuit decided the case of Gunther v. Washing-
ton49 and addressed the interrelationship of Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act in regard to the Bennett Amendment. The plaintiffs in Gun-
ther brought an action under Title VII alleging they had been denied
equal pay for equal work and that the defendant's termination and
later refusal to rehire them was done in retaliation for their demands
for equal pay.5 0 They further contended that even if the work was not
substantially equal, the defendant nevertheless violated Title VII if
some of the wage differential could be attributed to sex
discrimination.51
The Ninth Circuit found there were two plausible interpretations
of the Bennett Amendment: (1) the Amendment could be interpreted
to incorporate the Equal Pay Act's equal work formula into Title VII,
thereby limiting the scope of Title VII in the area of sexually discrimi-
natory compensation to claims that would also violate the Equal Pay
Act, or (2) the Amendment could be interpreted to only incorporate
the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into Title VII and not its
equal work standard.52 The court found the second interpretation was
more persuasive and was supported by a literal reading of the
Amendment.
Incorporation of the Equal Pay Act's first three affirmative de-
fenses did not make any substantive alteration in Title VII because the
three defenses are already included elsewhere in Title VII. But, the
court went on to state the incorporation of the Equal Pay Act's fourth
affirmative defense, allowing differentiation based on "any factor
other than sex," is significant.53 The court found the incorporation of
the fourth affirmative defense equates the burden of proof under Title
VII sex-based wage discrimination claims of unequal pay for equal
work with that of the Equal Pay Act claims. "The incorporation of the
fourth affirmative defense into Title VII makes clear that once a Title
VII plaintiff has shown that she was denied equal pay for equal work,
the burden shifts upon the employer to prove that the differentiation
was based on some factor other than sex."54
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Gunther was reviewed by the
Supreme Court.55 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
holding, but stated it did not decide in the case "the precise contours of
49. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979)(supplemental opinion denying rehearing), aff'd, 452
U.S. 161 (1981).
50. Id- at 1307.
51. Id.
52. Id at 1311.
53. Id- at 1319.
54. I&
55. Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
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lawsuits challenging sex discrimination in compensation under Title
VII."56 In its opinion the Court stated the incorporation of the fourth
affirmative defense into Title VII could have significant consequences,
but the court specifically stated it was not deciding in Gunther how
sex-based wage litigation should be structured under Title VII to ac-
commodate the fourth affirmative defense of the Equal Pay Act.57
The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the question of what rules
govern the allocation of the evidentiary burdens in a Title VII sex-
based unequal pay for equal work claim in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance
Co.58 The defendant in Kouba argued that standard Title VII rules
governed the allocation of the burden of proof, but the court found the
defendant had misallocated the burden. 9 Relying on its earlier deci-
sion in Gunther, the Ninth Circuit stated that even under Title VII the
defendant bears the burden of proving the wage differential resulted
from a factor other than sex. 60
The Seventh Circuit's response in Fallon to the Ninth Circuit's
holding was that it did not think the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, that
the incorporation of the Equal Pay Act's fourth affirmative defense
into Title VII clarifies the burden of proof required in a Title VII equal
pay case, is clear from the Bennett Amendment. 6 ' The Seventh Cir-
cuit stated it has interpreted the Bennett Amendment differently.
The court stated there wasn't anything said by the Supreme Court in
Gunther in regard to reallocating the burden of proof under Title VII
cases. 62 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit concluded the effect of the
Bennett Amendment was only to incorporate the substance of the
Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into Title VII and not its burden
of proof scheme.63
3. Eighth Circuit
In 1986 the Eight Circuit addressed the burdens of proof required
under a Title VII claim in McKee v. Bi-State Development Agency.6 4
The plaintiff in McKee argued that a jury verdict in her favor on her
Equal Pay Act claim required the district court to find liability on her
Title VII claim also.
The Eighth Circuit looked to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gun-
ther v. Washington and to other circuit court decisions in making its
56. Id at 181.
57. Id- at 171.
58. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982).
59. Id. at 875.
60. Id
61. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1215 (7th Cir. 1989).
62. Id
63. Id- at 1216.
64. 801 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1986).
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decision. The court stated that although the Supreme Court in Gun-
ther noted that it did not decide on the effect the incorporation of the
Equal Pay Act's defenses would have on the structure of sex-based
wage discrimination claims under Title VII, the court did indicate,
"that the incorporation of the 'factor other than sex' affirmative de-
fense could have 'significant consequences for Title VII litigation.' "65
The Eighth Circuit then held that the standards of the Equal Pay Act
are to apply to claims for unequal pay for equal work whether the suit
alleges a violation of the Equal Pay Act or Title VII.66
The Seventh Circuit in Fallon stated it disagreed with the Eight
Circuit's holding.67 The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Bennett
Amendment and its potential "significant consequences" on Title VII
litigation to be confined to situations where a defendant asserts a legit-
imate nondiscriminatory reason for the wage differential which may
cause a disparate impact.68 In this type of case, the Seventh Circuit
would interpret the Bennett Amendment under Title VII to preclude
liability. The court asserts it is this type of consequence the Supreme
Court was alluding to in Gunther, not a change in the traditional Title
VII burden of proof scheme.
4. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit had an opportunity to address the question of the
proper burden of proof under a Title VII sex-based wage discrimina-
tion claim of unequal pay for equal work in 1990 in Korte v. Diemer,69
after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Fallon. The plaintiff in Korte,
as in McKee, argued that a jury verdict in her favor on her Equal Pay
Act claim bound the trial judge to also find in her favor on her Title
VII claim of discriminatory compensation.7 0
The court in Korte stated that the determinative question was,
"whether the standards of liability under the two statutes are suffi-
ciently similar such that the jury's verdict in favor of Korte on her
Equal Pay Act claim necessitates that the trial judge find for Korte on
her Title VII unequal pay claim."71 The court looked at the Eighth
Circuit's decision in McKee where the Eighth Circuit ordered the dis-
trict court to enter judgment on the plaintiff's Title VII unequal pay
claim in accordance with a jury verdict in her favor on her Equal Pay
Act claim.72
65. I- at 1018 (quoting Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 160, 170 (1981)).
66. Id. at 1019.
67. FaUon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1217 (7th Cir. 1989).
68. Id. at 1215.
69. 909 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1990).
70. Id. at 957.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 958.
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The court also noted that both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits had
decided that although the two statutes were similar, they remain dis-
tinct as to proof and the allocation of the burden of proof.73 The Sixth
Circuit concluded by stating it found the distinction the district court
had drawn between Equal Pay Act liability and Title VII liability was
"overly technical". 74 The court stated,
A finding of "sex discrimination in compensation" under one Act is tanta-
mount to a finding of "pay discrimination on the basis of sex" under the other.
Conduct that a jury finds to be "based on" sex, and not motivated by nondis-
criminatory reasons, cannot later be found by a district court to lack an intent
to discriminate on the basis of sex.7 5
The court then held the jury's verdict on the plaintiff's Equal Pay Act
claim was binding on the district court as to the Title VII claim.
C. Who's Right?
The differing views of the circuits in answering the question of
whether a claim found to violate the Equal Pay Act under its burden
of proof scheme also automatically violates Title VII are based upon
the circuits' differing interpretations of the effect the incorporation of
the Bennett Amendment has on the burden of proof required under a
Title VII sex-based claim of unequal pay for equal work.
The Tenth, Ninth, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits base their answer to
the question on the conclusion that the effect of the Bennett Amend-
ment was to incorporate into Title VII the Equal Pay Act's burden of
proof scheme along with the four Equal Pay Act affirmative defenses.
The courts have essentially adopted the view of the Ninth Circuit in
Gunther, "The incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense into Ti-
tle VII makes clear that once a Title VII plaintiff has shown that she
was denied equal pay for equal work, the burden shifts upon the em-
ployer to prove the differentiation was based on some factor other
than sex."76
Meanwhile, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits based their holdings
upon a different interpretation. These courts found the Bennett
Amendment only incorporated the substance of the Equal Pay Act's
affirmative defenses into Title VII as "defenses" not "affirmative de-
fenses". The Seventh Circuit stated the exemptions under the Equal
Pay Act were set out as affirmative defenses because the Fair Labor
Standards Act traditionally treated exemptions as such, leaving de-
fendants to bear the ultimate burden of proof.7 7 Title VII, on the
73. I&
74. Id. at 959.
75. I&
76. Gunther v. Washington, 623 F.2d 1303, 1319 (9th Cir. 1979)(supplemental opinion
denying rehearing), aff'd, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
77. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1216 (7th Cir. 1989).
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other hand, has traditionally left the burden of proof on the plaintiff,
shifting it only when sex has been shown to be a "substantial" factor
in the claim.78
The court found a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act did not
implicate sex to this degree and, therefore, there is not justification for
shifting the burden to the defendant in Title VII sex-based claims of
unequal pay for equal work. The Seventh Circuit asserted the Ben-
nett Amendment effectively incorporated only the Equal Pay Act's
defenses and not its burden of proof scheme into Title VII.
To determine which interpretation is correct, the most logical place
to start is with the statute itself. Unfortunately in this case, neither
the wording of the statute nor the legislative history behind the adop-
tion of the Amendment is particularly helpful in setting out clear
guidelines that can be followed. This then leads to the question of
how the overlap between the two Acts should be reconciled absent
specific direction from Congress?
The Supreme Court in Gunther held the effect of the Bennett
Amendment was to incorporate the Equal Pay Act's affirmative de-
fenses into Title VII, but the Court stopped short of determining what
effect the incorporation of the fourth affirmative defense would have
on the burden of proof required in sex-based wage discrimination
claims brought under Title VII.79 In the absence of specific guidelines
from the Supreme Court or the statute itself, the circuit courts have
advanced differing interpretations of the Bennett Amendment and
how this overlap between the statutes should be reconciled.
The distinguishing factor between the opposing views seems to
come down to an answer to the question, does the adoption of the Ben-
nett Amendment and its incorporation of the Equal Pay Act's four
affirmative defenses into Title VII provide a basis for deviating from
the traditional Title VII analysis which would leave the ultimate bur-
den of proving discriminatory intent upon the plaintiff, and instead
require an Equal Pay Act analysis in sex-based claims of unequal pay
for equal work under Title VII? If it does not, then the position taken
by the Seventh and Fifth Circuits would seem to be correct. But, it
does.
Congress' adoption of the Bennett Amendment is sufficient reason
to shift the burden of proof in a Title VII case to the defendant, where
the plaintiff has proven members of the opposite sex are being paid
unequally for doing equal work. The Bennett Amendment states that
it shall not be unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of
sex in determining wages "if such differentiation is authorized under
78. Id. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)(O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
79. Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 160, 171 (1981).
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206(d) of Title 29."80 The exemptions listed under 206(d) are affirma-
tive defenses under the Equal Pay Act and must be proven by the
defendant.
It was a concern of Senators at the time of the passage of Title VII
that there were inconsistencies between the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII in the area of sex-based wage discrimination where the two stat-
utes overlapped. An example of this overlap is a case where a plaintiff
can prove she has been paid different wages than an employee of the
opposite sex for doing equal work. The plaintiff may assert this claim
under either statute. The Bennett Amendment was proposed to take
care of the possible inconsistencies that might arise from this overlap
by incorporating the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into Title
VII.
Once a plaintiff has proven unequal pay for equal work to employ-
ees of the opposite sex under the Equal Pay Act, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to prove the differential was due to one of the
exemptions listed under the Act. If the two statutes are to be con-
strued harmoniously and in par materia, it is logical to conclude that
in a Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claim where the plaintiff
has established unequal pay for equal work to members of the oppo-
site sex, the burden will also be placed on the defendant to prove the
wage differential is based on one of the exemptions listed under the
Equal Pay Act which was incorporated into Title VII through the Ben-
nett Amendment.
It is reasonable to conclude that the Bennett Amendment's incor-
poration of the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into Title VII also
incorporated the Equal Pay Act's burden of proving these defenses, if
the two statutes are to be construed harmoniously in the areas they
overlap. Therefore, in Title VII claims of unequal pay for equal work
based on sex, the appropriate analysis for the claim is under the Equal
Pay Act's burden of proof scheme. Equating the methods of analysis
for unequal pay for equal work cases in effect reconciles Title VII with
the Equal Pay Act in this area where the statutes overlap which was
Congress' intent in enacting the Bennett Amendment.
Congress' adoption of the Bennett Amendment provides ample
reason for courts to treat sex-based unequal pay for equal work claims
under Title VII differently than race, color, religion, or national origin
cases and to apply an Equal Pay Act analysis when examining these
claims.
This conclusion is supported not only in principle because it recon-
ciles the two statutes in this area, but is a practical conclusion as well.
Providing a unitary approach to examining claims that can be brought
under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII makes it less costly for the
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)(1988).
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plaintiff and the defendant. The expense of both time and litigation
can be reduced by tying the claims under both statutes together. But,
the savings of time and expense by using the same analysis for une-
qual pay for equal work claims under the two statutes is beneficial
only if it outweighs the costs associated with bringing the two statutes
together, which it does in this case.
The primary purpose of Title VII is to eliminate intentional dis-
crimination. Does an Equal Pay Act analysis of a sex-based wage dis-
crimination claim effectuate Title VII's purpose of eliminating
intentional discrimination? In Fallon the Seventh Circuit was con-
cerned with the fact that in a traditional Title VII case, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving discriminatory intent at all times, while
under an Equal Pay Act analysis a strict liability is established in that
a plaintiff is not required to show an intent to discriminate.81 The
Seventh Circuit's analysis overlooks the fact that a prima facie Equal
Pay Act case may be sufficient to establish an inference of intent to
discriminate according to Title VII guidelines.
A plaintiff can establish the defendant's intent to discriminate in a
Title VII case by direct evidence or intent can be inferred from a
plaintiff's prima facie case. In Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine, the Supreme Court said a Title VII prima facie case
raises an inference of discrimination if the established acts, not other-
wise explained, "are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors."8 2
To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, the plain-
tiff has to establish employees of the opposite sex who do equal work
under similar working conditions are being paid different wages.83
Therefore, by establishing a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act
analysis, the plaintiff has proven the difference in the amount of
wages being paid was not based on a differential in the work being
performed or a difference in the conditions the same work was being
performed under, two of the most common reasons an employer might
assert to justify the payment of different wages.
Arguably then, proof of these acts is sufficient to establish the
wage differential is more likely than not based on an impermissible
factor if they are not otherwise explained, clearly raising an inference
of discriminatory intent by the defendant. It is then up to the defend-
ant under Equal Pay Act analysis to prove the wage differential was
based on a factor other than sex.
Placing the burden of proof on a Title VII defendant once a prima
facie case of equal pay has been established does not interfere with the
81. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989).
82. 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
83. Coming Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974).
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effectuation of Title ViI's ultimate purpose of stopping intentional dis-
crimination. If a defendant is unable to prove the wage differential
was based on a factor other than sex, a strong inference of intent to
discriminate has already been established. The same elements must
always be proven to establish a prima facie Equal Pay Act case.
Therefore, use of the Equal Pay Act analysis assures that an inference
of intent to discriminate will be raised in every Title VII unequal pay
case.
Adoption of the "equivalence" rule by the circuits that states an
Equal Pay Act analysis is to be used for unequal pay for equal work
cases under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, theoretically will
not affect cases where the plaintiff could prove the pay differential
was not justified by seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production,
or any other factor other than sex, nor any case where the defendant
could prove the wage differential was justified.
The rule should only affect cases where the factfinder cannot de-
cide whether the differential is justified. In these cases it then be-
comes important to determine who is left with the ultimate risk of
nonpersuasion. If this set of cases is small, the significance of the
"equivalence" rule, which places the risk of nonpersuasion in Title VII
equal pay cases on the defendant in comparison to leaving it on the
plaintiff under the traditional Title VII analysis, is also small.
IV. CONCLUSION
The circuit courts are in disagreement over the answer to the ques-
tion of whether a violation of the Equal Pay Act automatically estab-
lishes a Title VII violation. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits argue the
two Acts require different proof and allocation of the burden of proof
and are, therefore, not equivalent. The Tenth, Ninth, Eight and Sixth
Circuits have concluded that once a plaintiff establishes an Equal Pay
Act violation Title VII is also automatically violated, finding the two
acts are equivalent as to proof and allocation of the burden of proof
under sex-based claims of unequal pay for equal work.
Congress' adoption of the Bennett Amendment to Title VII in its
attempt to reconcile the two Acts, plus the fact that the purpose of
both Acts can be effectuated by allocating the burden of proof in sex-
based claims of unequal pay for equal work (the area where the two
Acts overlap) according to the Equal Pay Act provides a strong basis
for following the decisions of the Tenth, Ninth, Eighth and Sixth
Circuits.
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